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Veterans Beware

March 9, 2011 by

This entry is cross-posted at Generally Speaking.

As a result of huge federal government debt and ongoing budget deficits, the Pentagon budget is coming under real scrutiny for the first time in years if not decades. Most Americans accept the Pentagon spending out of guilt, ignorance, fear, and limited liability patriotism. Defense contractors and assorted beltway bandits defend it out of greed. Politicians support it out of fear, greed and ambition. Veterans support it out of genuine patriotism, pride, and a loyalty to their service. I would suggest that veterans take a close, objective, look at their support of Pentagon spending.

In a nation that projects trillion dollar budgets over the next several years, how do you justify $7 million per year to sponsor a car on the NASCAR circuit? How do you justify more than $27 million per year to fund the DOD Senior Mentors program (AKA ”careerism on steroids”), which pays retired three and four stars $440 per hour, up to $179,000 per year, while receiving their full retirement benefits and being on the payroll of a defense contractor? How do you justify the fact that the U.S. defense budget is larger than the defense budgets of the next ten countries combined? How do you rationalize the fact that we are spending $6 billion per month in Afghanistan while we allocate $4.3 billion over four years to fund the Race to the Top, the U.S. government’s signature program to fix the nation’s broken public education system?

My difficulty in answering the questions above turns toward embarrassment as a veteran in light of the fact that the Defense Department is the only major federal government agency whose books are in such disarray that it cannot stand a financial audit. I am not talking about passing the audit; just undergoing one. DOD officials had committed to being able to undergo the audit by fiscal year 2000 but now say it will be 8-10 years before they will be able to do so. DOD officials cannot tell government auditors where more than $700 billion is spent each year. David M. Walker, former comptroller general of the United States has said, “I came to the conclusion that we have built the best fighting forces in the world at a very high cost and with a huge amount of waste. And the nation’s defense strategy is not as comprehensive, integrated, and future focused as it needs to be.”

There is much good that comes from a strong national defense. Informed, objective, patriotic, veterans must take the lead in imposing national thought, discipline and accountability into defense spending. Otherwise, greed, fear, ambition and limited liability patriotism will prevail in weakening national defenses.

Major General (Ret.) Dennis Laich is the Director of the PATRIOTS Program (www.ODUPatriots.com) for veterans at Ohio Dominican University.

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Changing Course in Afghanistan: It is Time to Bring Our Troops Home

March 8, 2011 by

The urgent case for the withdrawal of U.S. military troops and contractors from Afghanistan is simple and straightforward: a military solution in Afghanistan is neither feasible, affordable, or in the national security interest of the United States.

The war in Afghanistan has now become the longest war in America’s history, and the situation continues to go from bad to worse. Corruption continues unabated, including amongst the very private contractors to which scarce U.S. resources are flowing. The U.S. troop presence has increased from somewhere around 5,000 troops in 2002 to roughly 100,000 in 2011. At the same time, military and civilian casualties have increased at record rates. 2010 was the deadliest year in Afghanistan to date.

Perhaps most at odds with our national security interests, an imposing U.S. military footprint in Afghanistan has fueled the domestic insurgency and contributed to recruitment by transnational extremist elements which seek to characterize the United States as a foreign invader and occupier.

The American people are increasingly calling for a change in course in Afghanistan and an end to the continued loss of life and resources at the expense of vital domestic priorities such as quality education, affordable healthcare, and much-needed investments to create jobs and jump start the economy. Recent polling indicates that 72% of the American people, and a majority of both Republicans and Democrats, support congressional action to “speed up the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.”

Regardless of the situation in Afghanistan we have seen the Pentagon come back to us asking for more time, more troops, and more resources. Our troops have performed with incredible courage and commitment but they have been put in an impossible situation. The bottom line is we need to begin to end this war.

Military and foreign policy experts agree that there is no military solution in Afghanistan. Despite this reality, we have yet to see a clear plan for the diplomatic solution that is necessary to ensure long-term stability in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. After ten years of escalating troop levels and relying upon a costly, military-first strategy that has not worked, it is time to prioritize diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan which emphasize economic development, political reconciliation and inclusion, the engagement of regional and global stakeholders, and the safeguarding of basic human rights.

Lastly, White House and intelligence officials have acknowledged the threat of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is diminished and relatively small when compared to the number of members of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. The modern threat of terrorism can emanate from the tribal regions of Yemen or a hotel room in Germany. It is not practicable, or in our economic and national security interest, to address this threat through a military-first, boots on the ground strategy.

That is why last month I introduced H.R. 780, otherwise known as The Responsible End the War in Afghanistan Act. This bill, which has been co-sponsored by a bipartisan group of more than 50 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, would limit funding in Afghanistan to the safe, orderly redeployment of all troops and military contractors and end funding for combat operations.

It is time to reorient U.S. foreign policy to reduce the threat of terrorism in a more effective and sustainable manner. That process begins with bringing the war in Afghanistan to a close.

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Threats to the Profession of Arms

February 28, 2011 by

After ten years of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the stresses and strains of protracted conflict are not hard to find. The toll on equipment is obvious while the impact of four and five combat tours on individual soldiers is less apparent, yet well acknowledged. This essay suggests that consideration of the wear and tear of a decade of armed conflict on the overall health of the military profession is also appropriate.

West Point professor Don Snider is largely responsible for reintroducing the rhetoric of professions to the armed forces with his book, The Future of the Army Profession, now in its second edition.  In that book he asked a key question: “Is the Army a profession or it is merely an obedient bureaucracy?” His question is obviously equally applicable to all branches of the armed services.  He resolved that the Army has both professional and bureaucratic tendencies. A hallmark of professionalism includes faithful service to the client above all other priorities, a characteristic that distinguishes professions from bureaucracies. It is not hard to see why a professional mindset among military officers is a positive development. A profession that deeply understands its role in a democracy manned by professionals firmly dedicated to a professional ethic of faithful service serves as a protection against abuses that can emerge from a powerful standing military.

The Center for Public Leadership at Harvard University has tracked the level of confidence that Americans have in major sectors of society for over ten years in its National Leadership Index. The 2010 report once again reflects that despite a perceived crisis of declining confidence in many institutions, the United States military remains the most respected sector of our society. Clearly the sacrifices of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are appreciated. So what could possibly threaten so positive a view of such a well-grounded profession?

Interested long-term observers of the military might note a number of trends that, if continued, carry negative implications on both the military and society. Stewards of the profession, both in an out of uniform, would do well to keep an eye on such things in order to ensure that what is now merely a concern does not develop into a situation that threatens the ability of the profession to well serve the people. For the purposes of this contribution I submit two troubling trends for consideration: Increasing political partisanship within the officer corps, and the creation of a warrior caste that sees itself as inherently morally superior to the society it serves.

Increasing political partisanship of the officer corps. We have come a long way from the days when military officers refused to vote because they considered it too partisan of an activity. Today candidates seek the public support of retired military officers and some are only too happy to endorse them.  Jason Dempsey’s recent book Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations notes that officers are more likely to identify strongly as members of the Republican party. He boldly suggests, “This implies that being apolitical is not at all a part of army culture, at least as defined by the officer corps” (p. 124). Enlisted soldiers tend to be much less partisan while Blacks and Hispanics are more likely to identify as Democrats. During six years as a faculty member at the U.S. Army War College I saw outward manifestations that clearly indicated a shift in the culture. Bumper stickers that professed support for political candidates appeared on automobiles owned by military officers, and signs sprung up in the yards of family quarters on post that were eventually removed, but after days on display instead of minutes. Fox News played in the cafeteria and officers were vocal about their political preferences. In a recent and particularly shameful case an Army doctor, Lt. Col. Terry Lakin, refused to deploy to Afghanistan until President Obama produced a birth certificate. He rightly faced a court martial and was sentenced to dismissal and six months in prison. How long will it be until partisanship further negatively impacts the mission or undermines civil-military relations?

The military as a warrior caste, viewed internally as separate and superior to the populace. The United States military tends to view itself increasingly as a body apart from the populace it serves. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen spoke to the importance of maintaining a close connection with the public at the U.S. Army War College on February 10, 2011 stating, “We can’t drift away from the American people. We just can’t keep talking to ourselves. We have to tell them who we are and what we are doing. They want to know us better. How we make that connection is key.” The truth is that in many ways the military is different—it is fit, disciplined, focused clearly on mission accomplishment, and prepared to go to dangerous places to do difficult things. It is only right that their skills and dedication are appreciated. The military is not, however, inherently morally superior to the American society writ large. Being a soldier does not make one better than someone else, it simply makes the soldier want to be better. Every fault and perversion that exists in society is reflected in the ranks to varying degrees.  In that sense the military is more a microcosm of society than a bastion of morality.

Warrior castes and subcultures have rarely boded well for the societies in which they reside. In his 2005 book The New American Militarism, Andrew Bacevich noted the rise of “militaristic tendencies antithetical to the well-being of the armed services and incompatible with traditional conceptions of military professionalism” and added that, “soldiers made militarism possible and soldiers have ended up paying much of the price” (p. 35). The Army’s Warrior Ethos project is well intentioned and beneficial in many ways, as is the intensive socialization process that turns civilians into soldiers. We would do well to consider some of the long-term implications of such attitudes.

When combined with increasing political partisanship we begin to see small cracks in the profession that if not attended to could erode the public’s well-earned faith and confidence. At its extreme it could threaten the republic. Let’s avoid hyperbole here. I am not suggesting that the American people have anything to fear from their military—yet. There is every reason to believe that public confidence in the military is well placed. In some ways it is that very faith and confidence that could serve as a narcotic that prevents a serious examination from within the profession of the full impact of a decade of conflict. It might be tempting to bask in the good will of an adoring, yet inattentive public. It will not serve the military well, however, if constructive criticism and oversight are muted out of a misplaced sense of patriotism. After Vietnam, the U.S. military underwent a period of introspection, healing, and professional renewal. That could once again be the critical task for the next generation of military professionals.

Dr. George E. Reed served for 27 years as an Army officer, including six years as the Director of Command and Leadership Studies at the United States Army War College.

Filed Under: Defense Policy Journal, Defense Policy Magazine, Senior Contributors Tagged With: , , , , ,

Facebooking the War in Afghanistan

February 18, 2011 by

So I’ll have to admit, I’m torn on this one. New York Times journalist James Dao has a new article out about internet and cell phone use and “Facebooking” by troops deployed to Afghanistan.

I’ve never been to Afghanistan, or to Iraq for that matter, so I am hesitant to criticize commanders on the ground in Afghanistan for allowing this unprecedented level of cellular and social media access in a war zone. But the disciplinarian in me is concerned that this trend dangerously allows problems at home to become problems down range – as if there weren’t already enough problems for deployed units to deal with.

I certainly understand the rationale for allowing such unprecedented levels of access to cell and social media services on deployment. Communication with and access to families and friends back home have to be significant morale boosters for many troops. Allowing troops to watch births via Skype reduces the expense and disruption of sending troops home for such occasions. And enabling them to monitor the daily or weekly routines of life back home via Facebook can alleviate the worry that results from the wandering of the mind and the problem of assuming the worst case scenario.

But that very same monitoring can also lead to the highly disruptive micromanagement of personal affairs back home. And as the widely under-acknowledged problem of adultery and infidelity is discovered or becomes suspected because of the availability of information, even circumstantial, the effects can wreak havoc on individuals, units, and missions abroad.

Furthermore, although commanders insist that cell phones and portable games are prohibited on foot patrols, the example of one service member paying more attention to his blackberry than to the horizon while on a vehicular patrol is equally disturbing. And as we all know, for every one case that is witnessed, there must be one thousand cases that are not.

I tend to agree that a deployment should be a focused period of time where the service member is largely disconnected from life back home. With proper pre-deployment family and personal affairs planning and shorter deployment cycles, achieving this mission-optimal state should be possible.

Read the original New York Times article here: Staying in Touch with Home, for Better or Worse

Filed Under: Contributors, Defense Policy Magazine, Senior Contributors Tagged With: , , , , , ,

Lessons From Egypt

February 17, 2011 by

This entry is cross-posted at Generally Speaking.

Recent events in Egypt are indeed historic. They can be viewed through a host of lenses. Among them: the Egyptian people, President Mubarak, the Egyptian military, autocratic rulers in the Middle East and their citizens, terrorist groups like Al Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood, and Western governments. I will focus here on the lens through which the United States government and its national security apparatus have viewed the events at a strategic level, and what its implications might be in the future.

First, the events over these eighteen days showcased the clash between U.S. interests and espoused ideals. We attempted to straddle the fence between supporting the justified aspirations of millions of suppressed Egyptians and our own interests in the stability of a long time ally in the region. We knew that whatever position we took had secondary effects in other allied countries in the region led by dictators of suppressed populations. Ideals won out in the end, driven by events fortuitous for the U.S., but we lost some moral authority in the process. It is interesting that the Bush Administration’s “freedom and democracy” agenda in the Middle East is playing out but with a strategy and driving force they never considered. In both Iraq and Egypt dictators were toppled with two differences, one, we liked one of the two dictators and two, one of the actions did not cost the U.S. anything in blood or treasure. And as to final outcomes in the two, I would suggest that Iran is more likely to dominate Iraq’s future policies than the Muslim Brotherhood is to dominate Egyptian politics.

Second, these events illustrate a model or theory of these democratization processes. These types of events fall on a continuum from aspiration, to persuasion, to coercion. The American Revolution, the Solidarity Movement in Poland, and now the Tunisian and Egyptian movements fall into the aspiration category. Energy and determination came from the people. Persuasion is the least often experienced of the three, but may have been dominant in South Africa and Northern Ireland in our lifetimes. Finally, we have democracy through coercion, best exemplified in Iraq and Afghanistan where the U.S. continues to spend blood and treasure; democracy is foreign; and strong internal cultural, ethnic, and historic forces work against it. Clearly, democracy generated from the aspiration end of the continuum is preferable.

A final observation at the strategic level regards the effect these events may have on the “global war on terrorism” that the U.S. has been fighting for almost ten years at a cost of almost 6,000 lives and two trillion dollars to this point. Al Qaida has identified the overthrow of Mubarak as a primary goal since at least 1996. He has been overthrown and there is no hint of Al Qaida influences or involvement. Tunisia has gone the same route and several other Middle East dictators have taken steps to eliminate or reduce the grievances that Al Qaida has used to justify its movement and motivate its adherents. These aspiration and persuasive democracy movements reduce the market for what Al Qaida has to sell and reduced its effectiveness and brand. Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian issue, and overall U.S. Middle East policy are still potential rally cries for Al Qaida but its market for mayhem has contracted greatly. It remains to be seen whether America can take advantage of these developments in its “war on terrorism.” Watch closely.

Major General (Ret.) Dennis Laich is the Director of the PATRIOTS Program (www.ODUPatriots.com) for veterans at Ohio Dominican University.

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Praying for Rain after the SOTU

January 26, 2011 by

The 2011 State of the Union (SOTU) address was rife with motivating statements, applause moments, wild cheers, and statements that will be torn apart, each interest group holding up their favorite lines as if they were the most important of the night while ignoring the rest. Many of these interest groups will be just as angry towards promises unfulfilled as they are jubilant tonight, and much of this anger will be ignored by their peers. Still, key defense items came up that may or may not lead to a number of short media cycles, frenzies, and/or flavors of the day.

The President committed to open service for gay and lesbian troops this year. The phrasing did not point to certification of a repeal plan, but to full open service, so one can presume the necessary former will occur soon to leave time for the latter. However, the wording is vague enough such that failure to deliver can be blamed on contextual distractions and poor political timing. Inclusion of open service in the SOTU is a good sign, but certainly not indicative of any sort of time line for the full technical repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the implementation of open service.

The President also indicated a beginning to a withdrawal from Afghanistan in June of this year. A full time line was not provided, and the justification of the withdrawal was based on dubious claims that the situations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are on a positive trajectory. Of course, this is not to say that a withdrawal is not planned or that it would not happen. The sharp contrast to probable reality, however, suggests political pandering that could easily transform into delayed or shifted action.

Bottom line: the SOTU accomplished what it was designed to accomplish – a few political hits; some motivating, pandering moments; and a number of seeds planted that may or may not come to fruition. It is now up to groups interested in growing those seeds to plow the ground and pray for rain.

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Ongoing Language Training for Every Service Member

January 25, 2011 by

The re-emergence of the thought-provoking documentary Restrepo as a result of an Oscar nomination for Best Documentary Feature provides an opportunity to re-examine an issue that this film inadvertently highlighted and which probably went over the heads of many movie-goers who saw the film on the first go-around. The issue that jumped out of the film nearly as blatantly as the treachery of the Kornegal Valley in Afghanistan was the grossly insufficient amount of cultural and language training given to ordinary troops and commanders who have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. After nearly seven years of operations in Iraq and after more than eight years of operations in Afghanistan, the overall foreign language capability of the American armed forces remains inexplicably miniscule.

Most of the discussion, reporting, and criticism of America’s national critical language capacity centers around the numbers and foreign language skill levels of linguists, interpreters, analysts, and other specialized intelligence personnel, both military and civilian. Absent from the discourse is almost always any consideration of the foreign language skills of ordinary combat and combat support troops.

Speaking and understanding a foreign language like Arabic, Pashto, Dari, or Tajik is not only useful for the linguists and analysts back in Washington; that skill set can be time-saving, mission-saving, and even life-saving for the units and individual service members on the ground in theater who must interact with locals on a regular basis. The confusion and panic created when a U.S. service member has to kick in the door of an Iraqi home in search of insurgents is only exacerbated by the problem of basic communication. Even the use of an interpreter, when available, results in a communication delay that can cost precious time and can sometimes cause more confusion. Just imagine someone storming into your living room or bedroom in the middle of the night and yelling commands in a language that you do not understand. This can lead to extreme frustration and unnecessary panic on the part of both the intruder and the intruded upon.

In Restrepo, I was struck by the amount of goodwill, trust, loyalty, and respect lost among the locals by U.S. forces due to their inability to communicate at even a very basic level in the local language. In an operation for which winning hearts and minds is so critical, the ability to communicate in the local language can yield enormous dividends. Additionally, a serious focus on cultural sensitivities and a more-than-seemingly-reasonable level of respect for the population is necessary in light of the power imbalance between young commanders in their 20s and 30s and local elders in their 60s and 70s.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, service members often complain of long stretches of boredom. Many even have enough free time to take college courses and create Lady Gaga parody videos. Spare time would be much better spent in long-term, formal training classes on the local language(s). Such a regimen should also be incorporated into training in garrison, and could make an ideal way to keep returning service members on duty and engaged but also afford them an opportunity to relax and de-stress after a long and rough deployment.

In an ideal world, the importance of critical language and cultural education for every American service member would have begun within months after engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan got under way. However, it is somewhat understandable that Pentagon planners would have been focused in the beginning on other needs related to going to war. But after the second, third, fourth, fifth year of combat operations, it is inexplicable – and inexcusable – that critical language training was not introduced on a massive scale into the training regimen of service members.

After approximately seven and eight years in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively, there is no reason that every single American service member should not speak at least a basic level of Arabic, Pashto, Dari or some other critical language.

Filed Under: Contributors, Defense Policy Magazine, Senior Contributors Tagged With: , , , , ,

Sleeping with the Enemy and Afghanistan 2.0

December 14, 2010 by

Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, remarked this week that the United States was among his top three enemies and that if he had to choose between the U.S. and the Taliban, he would choose the Taliban. If that’s true (and even if it’s not… even if he’s saying it publicly, which he is), we should be seriously questioning our support for this man and the wisdom of continuing to pour billions of dollars into supporting his government.

What other enemy of the U.S. do we funnel billions of hard-earned American tax-payer dollars to on a monthly basis? Iran? No. North Korea? Maybe only in the form of food aid from time to time. And what message does it send to American troops fighting and dying on the ground in Afghanistan today when the President of that country says that the U.S. is an enemy? Aren’t American forces supposed to be fighting the enemy?

Karzai has been the only national leader that a post-Taliban Afghanistan has seen. Given that Afghanistan has been free of Taliban control for nearly 9 years now, Karzai’s extended hold on power is starting to resemble a typical – and failed – Third World political trajectory instead of a fledgling democracy. It’s time for the U.S. to begin backing Afghanistan 2.0.

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